CASE COMMENTARIES
BANKRUPTCY
A bankruptcy court may not enter final judgment on claims based solely on
state law that are not resolved in the process of ruling on a creditor’s proof of
claim. Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594 (2011).
By Todd B. Skelton
At issue in Stern v. Marshall was whether a bankruptcy court has the
constitutional authority to issue a final judgment on a state law counterclaim. The
Supreme Court held that the bankruptcy court does not have the constitutional
authority to decide a common law claim that is not resolved in the process of ruling
on a creditor’s proof of claim. The case arose from the saga of litigation between
Vickie Lynn Marshall and E. Pierce Marshall regarding the fortune of the late Texas
oil tycoon J. Howard Marshall II.
Vickie, more popularly known as Anna Nicole Smith, married J. Howard
Marshall II in 1994, about one year before his death. Vickie, who was J. Howard’s
third wife, received many gifts from J. Howard but was not named in his will.
Before J. Howard died, Vickie alleged in a Texas probate court that Pierce Marshall,
J. Howard’s son, fraudulently induced J. Howard to exclude her from an inter vivos
trust despite J. Howard’s alleged desire for her to inherit half of his property.
Following J. Howard’s death, Vickie filed for relief under chapter 11 of the
Bankruptcy Code. After alleging Vickie had defamed him by saying that he had
engaged in fraud to control his father’s assets, Pierce filed a proof of claim in the
bankruptcy court seeking to recover damages from Vickie’s bankruptcy estate.
Vickie responded with a counterclaim against Pierce for tortious interference with
the gift she had expected from J. Howard. The bankruptcy court granted summary
judgment for Vickie on Pierce’s defamation claim and later issued a judgment in
Vickie’s favor on her counterclaim.
Pierce disputed the bankruptcy court’s jurisdictional authority over the
counterclaim, but the federal district court, in an independent review of the record,
found that Pierce was guilty of tortious interference with regard to Vickie’s gift
expectations. Notably, the district court declined to follow the Texas probate court’s
earlier ruling for Pierce that the trust and will were valid. The Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals then reversed the district court’s finding by invoking the probate exception
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to federal jurisdiction. The United States Supreme Court subsequently reversed in
Marshall v. Marshall, 547 U.S. 293 (2006). On remand, the court of appeals held that
Vickie’s counterclaim was not sufficiently related to the proof of claim and found the
Texas probate court’s determination to be preclusive. By the time the Supreme
Court granted certiorari for the second time, both Vickie and Pierce had died and
their estates were continuing the litigation.
Only Article III courts may exercise the judicial power of the United States
under the Constitution. Congress cannot confer judicial authority on non-Article III
courts. Bankruptcy courts, however, are creatures of Congress under Article I of the
Constitution. Article I judges do not enjoy the same tenure and salary protections as
Article III judges. Under 28 U.S.C. § 157, bankruptcy proceedings can “arise under
title 11,” “arise in a case under title 11,” or be “related to a case under title 11.” A
bankruptcy court can enter final judgments on core proceedings arising under title 11
or arising in a case under title 11. Section 157(b)(2) delineates sixteen examples of
“core proceedings,” including “(C) counterclaims by the estate against persons filing
claims against the estate.” Final judgments by a bankruptcy court in core
proceedings are appealable to the district court. With the third type—a proceeding
“related to a case under title 11”—the bankruptcy judge “may only ‘submit proposed
findings of fact and conclusions of law to the district court’” under § 157(c)(1), and
the district court can enter final judgment after the opportunity for de novo review.
On appeal, the Supreme Court held that while the bankruptcy court had
statutory authority under 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(C) to enter final judgment on the
counterclaim for tortious interference, it lacked the constitutional authority to do so
under Article III because the state law counterclaim was not resolved in the process
of ruling upon Pierce’s proof of claim. The Court first considered the grant of
statutory authority under § 157. Vickie’s counterclaim against Pierce for tortious
interference was indeed a core proceeding because it was a “counterclaim by the
estate against persons filing claims against the estate.” Pierce had filed a proof of
claim against Vickie’s bankruptcy estate, and though the Court found ambiguous the
“arising under” and “arising in” language of § 157, the bankruptcy court did have the
statutory authority to enter final judgment on the counterclaim.
Next, the Court considered the constitutional aspect of the case. The Court
found that the bankruptcy court “in this case exercised the ‘judicial Power of the
United States’ in purporting to resolve and enter final judgment on a state common
law claim.” Because Vickie’s counterclaim was a state common law claim neither
arising from a federal regulatory scheme nor requiring resolution by an expert
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government agency, the public rights exception that excuses compliance with Article
III did not apply. In addressing the argument that the counterclaim was compulsory,
the Court found that the resolution of Pierce’s proof of claim would not result in
resolution of Vickie’s counterclaim. The Court also rejected the argument that the
bankruptcy court is a “mere adjunct” of the district court. Bankruptcy courts have
broad authority to resolve claims, but such authority must be within the confines of
the Constitution. Exercising the “judicial power of the United States,” however, is
reserved for Article III courts.
Finally, the Court rejected Vickie’s argument that restricting a bankruptcy
court’s ability to resolve counterclaims will cause delays and increase costs.
Efficiency and convenience “will not save [a law] if it is contrary to the
Constitution.” The law “already contemplates that certain state law matters in
bankruptcy cases will be resolved by judges other than those of the bankruptcy
court.” The majority describes their holding as a “‘narrow’ one,” implying that not
all counterclaims are barred from being heard by the bankruptcy courts. The Court
will not allow “slight encroachments” to “compromise the integrity of the system of
separated powers.” Accordingly, the Court found that Congress exceeded its
authority in this “one isolated respect” and that the “bankruptcy court below lacked
the constitutional authority to enter a final judgment on a state law counterclaim that
is not resolved in the process of ruling on a creditor’s proof of claim.”
Consequently, the Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Ninth Circuit Court
of Appeals.
Two other opinions were filed. Justice Scalia’s concurring opinion reiterated
his opinion that public rights must arise between the government and others and also
took issue with the “sheer numerosity” and “random[ness]” of the tests used to
“conclude[ ] that an Article III judge was required to adjudicate this lawsuit.” Justice
Breyer’s dissenting opinion, joined by Justices Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan,
questioned the majority’s weighting and analysis of precedent and, using a five-factor
test, concluded that the delegation of authority was constitutional.
The 5-4 decision in Stern v. Marshall has generated remarkable debate and is
significant for bankruptcy attorneys because of the new rule of law that bankruptcy
judges do not have the authority to decide claims based solely on state law.
Although the majority envisioned their holding to be narrow, this landmark decision
will affect creditors whose claims in bankruptcy proceedings are based solely on state
law and will likely place uncertainty on other claims traditionally decided in
bankruptcy court. Bankruptcy judges still, however, have the power to hear claims
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and counterclaims by debtors and creditors as long as they are related to federal law.
The holding emphasizes the need for counsel to carefully consider litigation strategy,
as not all core claims may be decided by the bankruptcy court. Parties must prepare
for delays in waiting on other courts to decide claims, and depending on the case,
claims for any number of creditors could be pending in state court, only adding to
the complexity of resolving debtor-creditor issues.
________

2012]

CASE COMMENTARIES

387

BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS
In Delaware, a creditor of an LLC who is neither a member nor an assignee of
the LLC lacks standing to bring a derivative suit, and this restriction on
derivative standing is constitutional. CML V, LLC v. Bax, 28 A.3d 1037 (Del.
2011).
By Catherine Rolen
At issue in CML V, LLC v. Bax was whether title 6, sections 18-1001 and 181002 of the Delaware Limited Liability Company Act (“LLC Act”) deprive an LLC’s
creditors from derivative standing, and if so, whether these sections of the LLC Act
are unconstitutional because they unduly restrict the Delaware Court of Chancery’s
equity jurisdiction. In CML, a creditor of an insolvent Delaware LLC brought a
derivative suit against the LLC’s managers for breach of fiduciary duties. However,
the chancery court determined that the creditor lacked derivative standing and
dismissed the case. On appeal, the Delaware Supreme Court affirmed the lower
court’s decision.
JetDirect Aviation Holdings, LLC (“JetDirect”) was a Delaware limited
liability company specializing in private jet management and chartering. In 2005,
JetDirect implemented a business expansion strategy in which it acquired several
small and mid-sized competitors. After implementing the expansion strategy,
JetDirect became highly leveraged and began having cash flow problems. In
addition, JetDirect had serious deficiencies in its internal accounting system.
JetDirect’s auditor informed the board and its officers of these deficiencies in 2006.
Rather than address these issues, JetDirect maintained the same internal auditing
practices, and the next year its new auditor refused to complete the audit because
JetDirect’s internal controls and accounting system were so unreliable.
Not surprisingly, JetDirect continued to have cash flow problems. Thus, in
April of 2007, JetDirect acquired a $25,743,912 loan from CML V, LLC (“CML”),
and CML later increased this loan to $34,243,912. Despite the fact that JetDirect’s
board did not have current information about the state of the company’s finances
due to the internal accounting deficiencies, the board continued with the expansion
strategy and made four more acquisitions after receiving the loan. JetDirect
defaulted on the CML loan in June of 2007, and by late 2008, JetDirect was insolvent
and began liquidating its assets. According to CML, JetDirect did not repay any of
the debt it owed CML even after liquidation.
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CML brought a derivative suit against individual members of JetDirect’s
board of managers, alleging a breach of the duty of care, a breach of the duty of
loyalty, and bad faith based on the board’s failure to implement an effective
accounting system and continuing to approve acquisitions despite not being fully
informed of JetDirect’s financial situation. The defendants alleged that CML lacked
standing to sue derivatively because the LLC Act denied creditors derivative
standing. CML countered that if the LLC Act barred creditors from suing
derivatively, then the Act was unconstitutional because it encroached on the
equitable jurisdiction of the court of chancery.
The two provisions at issue in CML are title 6, sections 18-1001 and 18-1002
of the Delaware Code. Section 18-1001 authorizes a member or assignee of an LLC
to bring an action in the court of chancery on behalf of the LLC when managers or
members have refused to do so. Thus, section 18-1001 permits members and
assignees of LLCs to sue derivatively. Section 18-1002 limits the plaintiff in a
derivative action to “a member or an assignee of a limited liability company interest
at the time of bringing the action.” CML argued that the two provisions read
together provide members and assignees derivative standing but do not limit
derivative standing only to those two groups.
On appeal, the Delaware Supreme Court held that (1) section 18-2002 of the
LLC Act precludes derivative standing for an LLC’s creditors, and (2) section 181002 is constitutional because it does not impinge on the court of chancery’s equity
jurisdiction. In interpreting the meaning of section 18-2002, the court looked to the
plain meaning of the statute and determined that it is unambiguous and exclusively
limits derivative standing to members and assignees of LLCs only. Therefore, the
LLC Act bars creditors who are not assignees or members from filing a derivative
suit. The court further found that reading sections 18-1001 and 18-1002 together
does not yield a different result. Section 18-1001 simply creates the right to file a
derivative suit on behalf of an LLC, and section 18-1002 further limits this right to
assignees and members. In response to CML’s argument that the General Assembly
intended to extend the rule of derivative standing for corporate creditors to creditors
of LLCs, the court asserted that the language in section 18-1002 clearly and
unequivocally restricts derivative standing to members and assignees and any other
reading would result in an absurd interpretation of legislative intent. The court noted
that the General Assembly is free to govern LLCs and corporations differently since
they are distinct entities, which offer a separate “bundle of rights” to investors.
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Therefore, CML’s contention that there should be no difference between LLCs and
corporations in regard to derivative standing is erroneous.
After holding that section 18-1002 denies creditors derivative standing, the
court turned to the issue of whether the LLC Act provision is constitutional.
According to the court, the Delaware constitution “prohibits the General Assembly
from limiting the equity jurisdiction of the court of chancery to less than the general
equity jurisdiction of the High Court of Chancery of Great Britain existing at the
time of [its] separation from the Mother Country.” Furthermore, at common law,
courts may extend corporate derivative standing to prevent injustice as new
circumstances arise. However, the court emphasized that this extension of equity
jurisdiction applies only to corporate derivative standing and not to LLC derivative
standing because LLCs did not exist until 1992 when the General Assembly passed
the LLC Act. Thus, the court found that the LLC Act is the only statute governing
adjudication of the rights and remedies related to Delaware LLCs. Although the
General Assembly included a provision in the LLC Act stating that common law
equity principles supplement the LLC Act provisions, common law governs only
where the LLC Act lacks a pertinent provision. Where an LLC Act provision
specifically addresses a certain issue, the LLC Act supersedes the common law. In
this case, there was an applicable LLC Act provision, which specifically stated that
only assignees and members of LLCs have derivative standing, so the court did not
need to look to a controlling common law principle to make a determination.
Therefore, the court held that section 18-1002 of the LLC Act is constitutional and
does not encroach on the court of chancery’s constitutional jurisdiction.
CML makes it clear that creditors of Delaware LLCs do not have standing to
sue derivatively, and attorneys representing a Delaware LLC’s creditors should
ensure that their clients negotiate terms to protect their interests in the LLC upon
forming a contractual relationship. As the Delaware court suggests, a provision
stating that the creditor will be converted to an assignee should the LLC become
insolvent would be a prudent way to protect a creditor’s interest. The outcome in
CML demonstrates that an LLC’s creditors in Delaware who do not protect their
interests through contract negotiation will have limited recourse because the LLC
Act bars them from suing derivatively. The case also has implications beyond the
preclusion of derivative standing for creditors. The Delaware Supreme Court
stresses that corporations and LLCs are distinct entities, which the General Assembly
is free to govern differently, and a transactional attorney should not assume that the
same common law principles that apply to corporations in Delaware also apply to
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LLCs. In particular, transactional attorneys should first look to the LLC Act to
determine if there is a direct provision that applies to any issue that arises during
drafting or negotiations before turning to common law principles since the court
clearly states that the LLC Act governs when there is an applicable provision. The
distinction the court draws between the governance of corporations and LLCs is
important for transactional attorneys to consider when negotiating contract terms for
clients who are LLCs or for clients who transact business with Delaware LLCs.
________
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CIVIL PROCEDURE
A resulting trust, rather than a constructive trust, is the proper equitable
remedy when the element of fraud is not proven in a property transfer dispute.
Williams v. Leaver, No. M2010-01874-COA-R3-CV, 2011 Tenn. App. LEXIS 524,
2011 WL 4477972 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 27, 2011).
By Fred Pickney
In Williams v. Leaver, the Tennessee Court of Appeals considered whether the
trial court properly imposed a constructive trust on a parcel of real property that was
transferred from parents to one child with the intention that both children would
share equally in the property. The court found that the trial court erred in imposing
a constructive trust because the plaintiffs failed to prove fraud. However, the court
found that the record contained clear and convincing evidence supporting the
imposition of a resulting trust, and affirmed the trial court’s judgment as modified.
In 1975, Irvin and Linda Sue Leaver (“the Leavers”) purchased 5.9 acres of
property in Rutherford County, Tennessee, where they later built a house.
Eventually, the Leavers’ two children, Wanda and Ted, both moved into mobile
homes on the property. In 2002, the Leavers had a meeting with both their children
regarding their desire to move to Florida. Although Ted and Wanda later disagreed
about what the Leavers communicated to them at that meeting, according to Wanda,
the Leavers intended for their property to be divided equally between Wanda and
Ted.
In December 2002, the Leavers quitclaimed the property to Ted and his wife,
Shelly, because Shelly was the only person financially qualified to assume the
mortgage that the Leavers had on the house. The deed did not mention Wanda or
her husband, Kevin.
In January 2005, Ted and Shelly moved into the main house, where the
Leavers lived before moving to Florida. Wanda and Kevin moved into the mobile
home formerly occupied by Ted and Shelly. Wanda and Kevin agreed to make
installment payments to Ted and Shelly to purchase the mobile home. In 2009, Ted
and Shelly sold their home and all six acres, including the mobile home, to Ted’s son,
Brandon, and his wife, for $150,000. Accordingly, Wanda and Kevin began making
their payments to Brandon. Beginning in August 2009, Wanda and Kevin failed to
make several monthly payments. Brandon filed a detainer action against Wanda and
Kevin.
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In November 2009, Wanda and Kevin filed a lawsuit seeking a declaratory
judgment and a constructive trust with respect to the six-acre tract of property. They
asserted equitable ownership in one-half of the value of the real property at issue, but
sought only the two acres referenced in their agreement with Ted and Shelly
regarding the purchase of the mobile home. At trial, Irvin Leaver testified (Linda
Sue Leaver was deceased) unequivocally that he intended the children to share the
property equally. He testified that it was his understanding that Ted and Wanda
would work things out so they each would get their equal share of the property. The
trial court found that the Leavers intended for their children to share equally in the
property and therefore found that Brandon was holding two acres of the property
subject to a constructive trust for the benefit of Wanda and Kevin.
A trial court’s findings of fact are reviewed de novo with a presumption of
correctness unless the evidence preponderates otherwise. Questions of law are also
reviewed de novo, but with no presumption of correctness. A party asserting a
constructive (or resulting) trust by parol evidence must prove the existence of the
trust by clear and convincing evidence. A constructive trust is appropriate only
against one who, by fraud, duress, abuse of confidence, or unconscionable conduct
has obtained an interest in property which he ought not in equity or in good
conscience retain. A resulting trust, however, does not require fraud or constructive
fraud. A resulting trust usually arises when one person becomes invested with legal
title but is obligated in equity to hold the legal title for the benefit of another. A
resulting trust generally arises on a failure of an express trust or the purpose of such
a trust, or on a conveyance to one person on a consideration from another.
On appeal, the Tennessee Court of Appeals held that the trial court erred in
imposing a constructive trust, but that another equitable trust, a resulting trust, was
proper, and affirmed the trial court’s judgment as modified. The court affirmed the
trial court’s finding of fact crediting Irvin and Wanda’s testimony that the Leavers
intended for their children to share equally in the property. The evidence in the
record did not preponderate against any findings of fact made by the trial court, so
the findings were presumed correct. The plaintiffs did not allege fraud or any form
of deceptive or unconscionable conduct by Ted and Shelly Leaver or by Brandon
Leaver. Therefore, the court found that imposing a constructive trust was error.
While the elements of a constructive trust were lacking, the elements of a
resulting trust were satisfied. Although the Leavers transferred the property solely to
Ted and Shelly, Ted and Shelly held a portion of the property in trust for Wanda and
Kevin. The meeting that the Leavers had with their children not only demonstrated
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their intention for the property to be shared equally, but also put Ted and Shelly on
notice of this intention. Although notice is not required for a resulting trust, notice
rebuts Ted and Shelly’s claim on appeal that they were bona fide purchasers and thus
not subject to any equitable trust. The court imposed a resulting trust because Irvin
and Wanda’s testimony clearly indicated a failure of an express trust and because it
would be inequitable to deny Wanda and Kevin an interest in the property.
Williams v. Leaver highlights the importance of accurately reflecting the
intention of the transferor when transferring property. As this case demonstrates,
informality often leads to litigation, even among family members. If Wanda and
Kevin’s interest had been clearly detailed in the property deed, litigation would have
been unnecessary. Wanda and Kevin were fortunate that Irvin was still alive and
able to testify to Linda Sue’s and his intention that the property be divided equally
among their children. Because the deed did not mention the Leavers’ intent, Wanda
and Kevin would have had difficulty proving the elements of an equitable trust to
the clear and convincing standard without Irvin’s testimony. Transactional attorneys
seeking to avoid litigation should either include the intent of the transferor directly in
the deed, or record it contemporaneously with the transfer in a trust agreement.
Williams v. Leaver is also a reminder of the importance of careful pleading.
The court found that the resulting trust entitled Wanda and Kevin to one-half of the
property. However, because Wanda and Kevin only sought two of the six acres,
one-third of the total property, the court affirmed the one-third to two-thirds split of
the property reached by the trial court. Courts will not grant relief which has not
been sought.
________
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CONTRACTS
Tennessee courts shall not invalidate a contract as a matter of public policy
when the provisions are legally severable or when the party seeking to
invalidate the contract has received the benefit of the other party’s
performance. Baugh v. Novak, 340 S.W.3d 372 (Tenn. 2011).
By Isabel T. Archuleta
In Tennessee, it is well established that individual autonomy and freedom of
contract are among the greatest of personal liberties. However, courts may invalidate
contracts entered between consenting parties on the grounds that they violate public
policy. A voluntary agreement may be deemed invalid as a violation of public policy
if the illegality is “inherent” and not simply collateral. In Baugh v. Novak, the
Tennessee Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether a contract for the sale of
an interest in a corporation and related indemnification agreements were
unenforceable because they were contrary to public policy. The Supreme Court
found that the purchasers of the corporate interest entered into the agreement as
informed buyers with their “eyes open.” In addition, the buyers received the benefit
of the seller’s performance for nearly a decade. And finally, neither party nor the
public was harmed by a violation of public policy.
In June 1992, Wendell and Laura Baugh acquired Precision Services, Inc. from
Ronald and Gayla Miller. The Millers agreed to finance the transaction, and the
Baughs personally guaranteed a note executed by the corporation that purchased
Precision and the right to use its name.
Herman Novak and his wife, Faith, were friends and neighbors of Mr. and
Mrs. Baugh. In 1994, Messrs. Baugh and Novak bought Penske Plastics, Inc., and
per their arrangement, were jointly and severally liable for the company's debts and
obligations. Additionally, both agreed to share the company's profits equally.
In late 1994 or early 1995, Mr. Baugh offered to sell one-half of Precision
Services to Mr. Novak. Because Mr. Baugh found the Millers difficult to deal with,
he asked his attorney to structure the transaction so that Mr. Novak could purchase
an interest in Precision without obtaining the Millers' permission. The final
document included an indemnity clause in which the Novaks agreed to indemnify
the Baughs for fifty percent of any payments they were required to make on the
Millers' note and Precision's other debts. Likewise, the Baughs provided an
indemnity agreement to the Novaks per their request.
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In 2003 a fire destroyed the Penske Plastics building, along with the original
signed copies of the Baugh-Novak 1995 purchase agreements. In 2005, Messrs.
Baugh and Novak sold Penske Plastics to Alcan Baltec. Up to the time of the
closing of the sale of Penske Plastics, Precision's debts and loan obligations were
paid using the revenue of Penske Plastics. In December of 2005, Mr. Novak
essentially “wash[ed] his hands” of the Precision obligations in a handwritten note
sent to Mr. Baugh.
Mr. Baugh, having everything “dumped on his lap,” began paying Precision's
obligation to the Millers and its loan to First State Bank using his personal funds. On
June 19, 2006, Mr. Baugh filed suit against the Novaks to enforce the terms of the
1995 indemnity agreement, arguing that he was entitled to indemnification and
reimbursement for Precision's obligations to the Millers and First State Bank. The
Novaks counterclaimed, arguing that the Baughs had fraudulently provoked them to
purchase the interest in the corporation.
The trial court awarded $201,715.50 to the Baughs and dismissed the
Novak’s counterclaim. The Tennessee Court of Appeals, however, on its own
motion, invalidated the purchase agreement and the related indemnification
agreements because they were contrary to the public policy established in section 4816-208 of the Tennessee Code. On appeal, the Tennessee Supreme Court noted that
while courts may have the authority to nullify or invalidate contracts on the grounds
of public policy, the authority requires the courts to act with “great delicacy.” To
simply void contracts because they contradict public policy is “in tension with the
freedom of contract and the desire to hold parties to their voluntary agreements.”
In determining whether a contract should be deemed unenforceable on the
grounds of public policy, the court provided a three-prong test: (1) the violation of
public policy must be clearly established; (2) the violation must be inherent in the
contract itself or the contract’s purpose must taint it with illegality; and (3) a clear
public detriment must be likely to occur as a result of the contract or the object of
the contract must tend to injure the public. Additionally, the court explained that in
situations where the party seeking an invalidation of the contract has received the
benefit of the other party’s performance, courts must be even more hesitant to
nullify the contract on the grounds of public policy.
The Tennessee Supreme Court, in upholding the trial court’s determination
that the contract did not violate public policy, held first that neither the public, the
Millers, nor the Novaks were harmed by any violation of section 48-16-208. Second,
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it is not clear that the stock purchase agreement made in 1995 between Messrs.
Baugh and Novak violated section 48-16-208. Third, it is unclear that the Tennessee
General Assembly intended to invalidate contracts like the one in question. Fourth,
the overreaching remedy of invalidating the purchase and indemnity agreements is
unnecessary as it would be simple to sever the indemnification arrangement from the
stock purchase agreement. Finally, the court emphasized the fact that in the case at
hand, the Novaks, the party wishing to invalidate the agreement, enjoyed the benefit
of the Baughs performance under the contract for almost a decade. Thus, the
Tennessee Supreme Court reinstated the trial court's decision and dismissed the
Novaks’ appeal.
The Tennessee Supreme Court’s ruling in Baugh v. Novak serves as a reminder
of the arduous battle a party faces when trying to invalidate a contract between
private parties on the grounds of public policy. The decision emphasizes the
importance of the individual right of freedom of contract and the limited authority
the courts have in addressing voluntary private party agreements. Attorneys
representing contracting parties should encourage their clients to thoroughly
consider the contracts in which they enter, and remind their clients that possible
violations of public policy are not an absolute “out.” Instead, the contracting parties
will likely be required to live by the consequences of their voluntary agreements.
________
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INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
The clear and convincing evidentiary standard applies to all invalidity
challenges to patents, even when the patent’s prior art has not been
considered by the United States Patent and Trademark Office. Microsoft Corp. v.
i4i Ltd. P’ship, 131 S. Ct. 2238 (2011).
By CeCe Ging
In a patent infringement action, an alleged infringer may assert invalidity of
the patent as a defense. In Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. P’ship, the United States Supreme
Court addressed the issue of the standard of proof in a patent invalidity defense,
specifically whether § 282 of the Patent Act of 1952 requires an invalidity defense to
be proven by clear and convincing evidence.
I4i Limited Partnership (“i4i”) holds a patent that claims an improved
method for editing computer documents. In 2007, i4i filed for a willful infringement
action against Microsoft Corporation (“Microsoft”). In addition to denying
infringement, Microsoft counterclaimed and sought a declaration that i4i’s patent
was invalid and unenforceable. Specifically, Microsoft claimed that i4i’s prior sale of
a software program, known as S4, more than one year prior to the filing of the i4i
patent application rendered the patent invalid. The only disputed fact was whether
the S4 software embodied the invention claimed in i4i’s patent. Relying on the
undisputed fact that the prior sale of the S4 software was never presented to the
United States Patent and Trademark (“USPTO”) examiner, Microsoft objected to
the jury instruction that required Microsoft to prove its invalidity defense by clear
and convincing evidence. The Federal District Court dismissed Microsoft’s
objection, and the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed.
According to § 282 of the Patent Act of 1952, “a patent shall be presumed
valid” and “the burden of establishing invalidity . . . rests on the party asserting such
invalidity.” Under the Federal Circuit’s reading of § 282, a defendant seeking to
overcome this presumption must persuade the fact finder of its invalidity defense by
clear and convincing evidence.
In a unanimous decision, the Supreme Court held § 282 requires an invalidity
defense to be proven by clear and convincing evidence regardless of whether the
evidence before the fact finder was examined by the USPTO during the examination
process. Any recalibration of the evidentiary standard of proof in a patent
infringement case remains in the hands of Congress. In reaching this decision, the
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Court rejected both of Microsoft’s arguments: (1) that a defendant in an
infringement action need only persuade the jury of an invalidity defense by a
preponderance of the evidence and (2) in the alternative, that the standard of proof
should be lowered to a preponderance of the evidence when an invalidity defense
involves evidence not presented to the USPTO.
In response to Microsoft’s arguments, the Court emphasized statutory
interpretation rather than policy considerations. The Court pointed out that where
Congress uses a common law term in a statute, the Court will assume the term
comes with a common law meaning, absent anything pointing another way. Here, by
stating that a patent is “presumed valid” in § 282, Congress used a term with a settled
meaning in the common law. The Court held thirty years before the enactment of §
282 in Radio Corp. of America v. Radio Engineering Laboratories, Inc., 293 U.S. 1(1934),
that a presumption cannot be overthrown except by clear and cogent evidence. By
the time Congress enacted § 282 and declared that a patent is “presumed valid,” the
presumption of patent validity had long been a fixture of the common law. Under
the general rule that a common law term retains its common law meaning, the Court
concluded that Congress did not intend to “drop” the established heightened
standard of proof from the presumption simply because § 282 fails to reiterate it
expressly.
In addition, by rejecting a fluctuating standard of proof, the Court noted that
nothing in the text of § 282 suggests that Congress meant to enact a standard of
proof that would rise and fall with the facts of each case. The established case law
only reflects that new evidence supporting an invalidity defense may “carry more
weight” in an infringement action than evidence previously considered by the
USPTO; however, the standard of proof remains the same.
Finally, the Court stated that it was in no position to judge the comparative
force of the proposed policy arguments from both sides. Congress specified the
applicable standard of proof in § 282 of the Patent Act in 1952. Since then, it has
allowed the Federal Circuit’s clear and convincing standard to remain in place. Not
once has Congress, who has the power to recalibrate the standard of proof, even
considered a proposal to lower the standard of proof.
The Supreme Court’s decision in this case effectively reaffirmed the
heightened standard of proof required for an invalidity defense in a patent
infringement case. This is good news for patent holders because the Court’s
decision maintained the value of U.S. patents by both preserving the presumption of

2012]

CASE COMMENTARIES

399

patent validity and rejecting the application of a lower standard of proof for
establishing patent invalidity. However, transactional attorneys should still be
cautious in dealing with patents. Even though the Court has upheld the clear and
convincing standard, it emphasized that “new evidence,’’ not originally presented to
the USPTO, may still carry more weight to overcome the standard of proof. Also,
the Court did not dismiss the policy arguments in favor of a lower standard; it only
shifted the decision-making process to Congress.
________
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PROPERTY
Boundary line disputes involving only boundary deeds invite courts to rely
heavily on the opinions of experts and surveyors, encouraging clients to
rigorously search for those willing to find in their favor. Dillehay v. Gibbs, No.
M2010-01750-COA-R3-CV, 2011 Tenn. App. LEXIS 325, 2011 WL 2448253 (Tenn.
Ct. App. June 16, 2011).
By Annie Ellis
Boundary line disputes are problematic when the only relevant deeds are
boundary deeds, which by definition do not give necessary calls and distances to
place the exact mathematical locations of the disputed property lines. The
inadequacy of the boundary deeds invites the courts to rely heavily on the opinions
of experts and surveyors, encouraging parties to rigorously search for professionals
to find in their favor. In Dillehay v. Gibbs, the Tennessee Court of Appeals
established a procedure for how these types of disputes are to be handled and what
types of offered opinions are to be considered.
The boundary line dispute in Dillehay concerned two neighboring farms in
Smith County, Tennessee. Ms. Gibbs (the “Defendant”) purchased her farm in 1993
by a deed conveying 159 acres. The Defendant was “returning” home as the farm
had been in her family since 1920. Ms. Dillehay (the “Plaintiff”) purchased her farm
in 2005 by a deed conveying two tracts, which together amounted to 134 acres. The
Plaintiff, and her seller, were unfamiliar with the farm and asked the Defendant
where the boundary line was located during a tour of the property. Upon inspection
of the premises, the parties realized that the area was littered with remnants of old
fences and could see that the location of the correct fence line would be the subject
of a later dispute.
The Plaintiff filed her complaint in chancery court to establish the boundary
line between the two farms. A temporary restraining order was issued enjoining
both parties from trespassing upon the disputed land. The Defendant answered the
Plaintiff by contending that she had a valid recorded survey depicting the true
property lines in her favor, and alternatively, that she was the true owner by virtue of
adverse possession.
Because the parties only held boundary deeds, both parties hired licensed
land surveyors to establish a definitive boundary line. Each surveyor suggested a
different line established from different methods with varying degrees of certainty.
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Generally, the Plaintiff’s experts’ lines followed a woven-wire fence and were set
further east than the Defendant’s expert’s line, which was set to the west and
followed the remnants of a barbed wire fence.
The Plaintiff’s first expert, Mike Holland (“Mr. Holland”), researched land
records at the courthouse, collected data in the field, and spoke with both parties.
He did not perform a mathematically closed survey of the farm. At trial, he
presented a line extrapolated from old deeds in the Plaintiff’s chain of title, using the
calls, distances, and monuments of those deeds. He offered that although these
markings were not from the Plaintiff’s deed itself, the old deeds reflected the
boundary line as it was understood at the time of their making. However, Mr.
Holland’s line was problematic because he never shot the line from the ground and
only drew it from a map. Further, while Mr. Holland stated that his exhibit
represented the line to a reasonable degree of certainty, he refused to actually call it
the “boundary line.” He said he would “‘not force a line.’”
Accordingly, the Plaintiff hired a second expert, Richard Puckett (“Mr.
Puckett”). Mr. Puckett’s line generally followed Mr. Holland’s line. However, unlike
Mr. Holland, Mr. Puckett shot his line from the ground, and consequently, his line
was more contoured to the shape of the land. Still, Mr. Puckett testified that
because the two properties only had boundary deeds, mathematical closure of the
boundaries was not possible and that he did not actually know where the boundary
line was.
The Defendant’s expert, Carroll Carman (“Mr. Carman”), testified to a line
located much further west of Mr. Holland’s and Mr. Puckett’s. He offered that his
line was accurate to a reasonable degree of certainty and discussed his methodology
in greater detail than the Plaintiff’s experts. He had researched deeds, interviewed
adjoining landowners, and attempted to plot the line from the ground. After finding
the woven-wire fence that the Plaintiff’s experts’ lines followed, the Defendant’s
siblings told him that the boundary line was past that point. He found many fence
remnants and surmised that they were once used for the containment of farm
animals rather than boundary markers because of their arbitrary locations. After
using a metal detector, he found the remnants of a barbed-wire fence on a very steep
incline. Mr. Carman stated that, in his expert opinion, a containment fence would
not be placed in such difficult terrain and that the amount of effort that would be
required to place the fence there would have been intended to mark between the two
farms. Mr. Carman reasoned that this was the best conclusion available to a land
surveyor. Although he could not promise the line was of absolute certainty, he could
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contend it was of reasonable certainty. He further admitted that he did not use the
Plaintiff’s deeds in her chain of title because they were not presented to him until
two years after he completed his survey.
Both parties also presented lay testimony to establish the boundary line. The
Plaintiff called a former owner in her chain of title who testified that he grew
tobacco and raised cattle on the properties. The owner said he and his family used a
barbed-wire fence to contain the animals. However, he was unclear as to where the
exact boundary line was, but did say that it was to the east of Mr. Carman’s.
The Defendant called four of her siblings, each of whom lived on the farm in
their youth and testified regarding the boundary line as it was understood at that
time. Each of the siblings testified that the barbed-wire fence was meant to mark the
boundary line and all other fences were meant to contain hogs and other farm
animals.
The trial court found: (1) that Mr. Carman’s survey established the boundary
line between the two farms; (2) that the Defendant had adversely possessed the
disputed area; and (3) that the Plaintiff’s predecessors in title had acquiesced in the
boundary line as set by the barbed-wire fence.
On appeal, the Tennessee Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s
holdings. The Plaintiff argued that the trial court erred by relying on the survey of
the Defendant’s expert, and not on the Plaintiff’s experts. The appellate court
reviewed the trial court’s decision de novo with a presumption of correctness as to the
trial court’s findings of fact.
Tennessee courts previously established that when a boundary line is in
dispute, the court is to first look at the natural objects or landmarks on the property,
then to the artificial objects or landmarks, followed by the boundary lines of adjacent
pieces of property, and finally to courses and distances contained in documents
relevant to the disputed property.
Tennessee courts have also concluded that for the evidence to preponderate
against a trial court’s finding of fact, it must support another finding of fact with
greater convincing effect. The Tennessee Court of Appeals could not do so in this
case and affirmed judgment for the Defendant. The court reasoned that the case
essentially boiled down to a decision between two flawed surveys that the trial court
most credited—Mr. Holland’s, cobbled together from ancient deeds with little
apparent connection to the land and a disclaimer to its veracity, or Mr. Carman’s,
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shot from the ground on an old fence with slight support from the old deeds.
However, the court did find it persuasive that only Mr. Carman established a line
within a reasonable degree of surveying certainty. Only he provided detailed reasons
supporting his decision and extensive critiques of the other experts’ methods.
Further, the testimony of the Defendant’s siblings corroborated his conclusion. The
appellate court admitted that neither party’s evidence was overwhelmingly
compelling, but it gave great deference to the trial court’s findings regarding the
competing surveys. Therefore, it affirmed the trial court’s decision.
Dillehay v. Gibbs encourages Tennessee transactional attorneys dealing with
boundary deeds in a boundary line dispute to search diligently for experts and
surveyors who will rigorously search any available methods to find in their client’s
favor. The lack of precision that boundary deeds provide invites these types of
methods and opinions and assigns greater weight to them than would exist in a
boundary dispute involving deeds with mathematical precision. It is also of crucial
importance that any testifying expert both call his conclusion “the boundary line,”
which was Mr. Holland’s mistake, and testify to a “reasonable degree of surveying
certainty,” which was Mr. Puckett’s mistake. Further, attorneys should realize there
is little hope for relief on appeal because of the great deference to a trial court’s
decision in these matters.
________

Under Tennessee law, courts must analyze conflicting deed provisions on a
case-by-case basis, heeding the grantor’s intent as shown in the specific
language and circumstances of that particular deed. Rhoden v. Rhoden, No.
W2010-00263-COA-R3-CV, 2011 Tenn. App. LEXIS 532, 2011 WL 4489985 (Tenn.
Ct. App. Sept. 29, 2011).
By Keshia L. Williams
In Tennessee, the interpretation of a deed is a question of law for the court’s
determination. In interpreting a grantor’s intent in a deed of property, Tennessee
courts consider the document’s language and surrounding circumstances, taking into
account a presumption favoring enforcement of every deed provision. In Rhoden v.
Rhoden, the Tennessee Court of Appeals addressed whether a tenancy in common
created by deed may include a right of survivorship in light of the deed’s language.
Following precedent, the court held that the express language of the deed controls
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the establishment of a right of survivorship regardless of the property interest
conveyed.
In a sale on August 31, 1992, Eleanor H. Reed (“Reed”) transferred twentysix acres of land by deed to Clarence Rhoden (“Father”) and his son Richard Rhoden
(“Richard”). The deed identified both Father and Richard “as tenants in common
with a right of survivorship” but also conveyed the property to Father, Richard, “and
their heirs.” Father, Richard, and a second son Donald Rhoden (“Donald”) lived on
the property together. After Father’s death, however, Richard asked Donald to
vacate the property, and Donald refused to leave. On April 12, 2010, Richard filed
an unlawful detainer action against Donald, claiming that Donald had no legal right
to hold over possession of the property after Father’s death and Richard’s request.
On December 28, 2010, after a bench trial, the Circuit Court of Chester
County entered an order in favor of Richard. The trial court relied heavily on the
deed’s language, which specifically mentioned creating a right of survivorship in the
surviving tenant. On appeal, the Tennessee Court of Appeals affirmed the circuit
court’s opinion on the validity of the right of survivorship in the tenancy in common
at issue. Because a deed is interpreted primarily to determine the grantor’s intent, the
court of appeals held that the specific language of survivorship in the deed
outweighed any possible ambiguities in other generic provisions of the deed, such as
the type of interest conveyed and the declaration of clear title.
Under Tennessee law, the language within and the circumstances
surrounding a deed govern the court’s consideration of the grantor’s intent in
transferring the property at issue. In completing this determination, courts presume
that the parties intended for every provision of the deed to hold some validity.
Therefore, a court will interpret a deed in the manner likely to give effect to the most
provisions possible.
A tenancy in common neither automatically creates a right of survivorship
nor absolutely prohibits such a right. In Runions v. Runions, 207 S.W.2d 1016 (Tenn.
1948), the Tennessee Supreme Court established the validity of combining a right of
survivorship with a tenancy in common created by deed. The court in Runions held
that, in light of the grantor’s intent, the right of survivorship and the tenancy in
common are both valid when explicit language in the deed created the survivorship
right. The type of estate given does not control a survivorship right for which the
deed explicitly provides.
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On appeal, the Tennessee Court of Appeals held that a right of survivorship
was valid within a tenancy in common when the deed’s language conveyed that the
grantor’s intent was to create such a right within that estate. The court found a right
of survivorship in Richard, which entitled him to sole ownership and possession of
the property.
The key to determining the validity of the right of survivorship lies within the
deed’s language and the grantor’s intent regardless of the type of estate created.
Donald first argued that as a matter of Tennessee law, a right of survivorship could
not exist within a tenancy in common irrespective of the deed’s reference to such a
right. Essentially, he argued that the legal definition of a tenancy in common did not
allow for a survivorship right. Here, the court confirmed that a tenancy in common
does not create a right of survivorship without some express indication of the right.
However, the court strictly followed the approach in Runions, relying on the deed’s
language as evidence of the grantor’s express intention to create a right of
survivorship even when conveying an estate in common.
Further, in considering the face of the deed, generic provisions, such as
technical descriptions and declarations of clear title, are insignificant in comparison
to explicit language creating a right of survivorship. As an alternate argument,
Donald insisted that the conveyance of property to Father, Richard, “and their heirs”
was inconsistent with a right of survivorship in the surviving tenant in common.
However, the court found no relevance in the phrase “and their heirs” and ruled that
its use merely established that Reed conveyed good, clear title to Father and Richard
through the deed. Though there was no transcript or statement of evidence from
the circuit court’s bench trial on which to factually base this assumption, the court of
appeals consciously chose to focus on the direct language of survivorship in spite of
a possible inconsistency in a more general deed provision.
Rhoden v. Rhoden provides distinct support for interpreting a deed by its most
direct language. The court’s decision to uphold a right of survivorship within a
tenancy in common based on a deed’s language serves as a reminder for both
attorneys who draft deeds for clients and attorneys whose clients enter deeds that
others drafted. For clients transferring property by deed, the creation of a right of
survivorship for a tenancy in common hinges on the explicit language of the deed.
Therefore, in conveying property, the drafter must be careful to either explicitly
include or exclude the mention of a survivorship right in the surviving tenant. On
the other hand, attorneys reviewing deeds for clients who will receive the property
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must be careful to ask clients whether they desire a right of survivorship and then to
determine whether the deed’s express language provides such a right.
Though the Tennessee Court of Appeals followed the Tennessee Supreme
Court’s principle in Runions, the designation of Rhoden v. Rhoden as a memorandum
opinion shows the court’s hesitance to create precedent in its holding. While Runions
established the validity of a right of survivorship within a tenancy in common, its
holding broadly focused on the grantor’s intent, leaving the door open for
interpretations as to what language, in light of some ambiguities, concretely
establishes that intent. Rhoden v. Rhoden exemplifies how Tennessee courts must
employ a case-by-case analysis of possibly conflicting deed provisions to determine
the grantor’s intent.
________
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SHAREHOLDER LITIGATION
Under Delaware Law, a Brophy claim no longer requires an element of harm
to the corporation for disgorgement to be an available remedy. Kahn v. Kolberg
Kravis Roberts & Co., L.P., 23 A.3d 831 (Del. 2010).
By Nathaniel Dallas
In Brophy v. Cities Serv. Co., 70 A.2d 5 (Del. Ch. 1949), the Delaware Court of
Chancery held that a plaintiff may bring a claim for breach of fiduciary duty even if
there is no harm to the corporation. Later, in Pfeiffer v. Toll, 989 A.2d 683 (Del. Ch.
2010), the Delaware Court of Chancery concluded that the purpose of a Brophy claim
is to remedy harm to a corporation. As such, the Court of Chancery stated that in
most cases a corporation would only be allowed to recover for actual harm.
However, the court did state two circumstances where disgorgement would be
“theoretically available”: (1) where the fiduciary engages in actual fraud and (2) where
confidential information is used to compete directly with the corporation. In Kahn v.
Kolberg, the Delaware Supreme Court addressed whether a Brophy claim, under any
circumstances, requires an element of harm before disgorgement is an available
remedy.
In Kahn v. Kolberg, Alan Spiegal and Linda Parnes Kahn (collectively “Kahn”)
brought suit against Kohlberg, Kravis, Roberts & Co., L.P. (“KKR”), Primedia, Inc.
(“Primedia”), and eleven current and former directors of Primedia. Spiegal and
Kahn were minority shareholders of Primedia. KKR was a majority shareholder
with three of its designees on Primedia’s board of directors (the “KKR directors”).
In late 2001 and mid-2002, Primedia’s board of directors approved two separate
plans, each authorizing Primedia to acquire up to $100 million of its preferred shares.
Five days after the second $100 million was authorized, the KKR directors sent an
advisory memorandum to KKR that contained nonpublic information about
Primedia and advocated the purchase of Primedia’s preferred shares.
At some point during 2002, KKR sought permission from Primedia’s board
of directors to purchase Primedia’s preferred shares. The unanimous written
consent stated, in part, that KKR’s purchase of $50 million shares was acceptable
and not a usurpation of corporate opportunity. Primedia’s board of directors
purportedly executed the written consent on July 8, 2002, although the record was
unclear as to when the written consent became effective. Nonetheless, on July 3,
2002, KKR formed ABRA III, L.L.C. (“ABRA”) as an investment vehicle to
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purchase Primedia’s preferred stock, and between July 8, 2002 and November 5,
2002, purchased $75 million of Primedia’s preferred stock.
Following these events and Primedia’s redemption of some of its preferred
stock, Kahn filed a derivative action against KKR, Primedia, and eleven Primedia
directors. Later, Kahn filed the First Amended Complaint alleging that the
redemptions of Primedia’s preferred stock were unfair to Primedia and benefited
KKR at a cost to Primedia. After its first motion to dismiss was denied, Primedia
formed a Special Litigation Committee (the “SLC”) to investigate the claim. The
SLC moved to stay the action pending its investigation and the court granted the
stay. During the investigation, Kahn filed the Second Amended Complaint.
However, it was not until after reviewing the SLC’s report that Kahn filed the Third
Amended Complaint which included the Brophy claim that KKR breached its
fiduciary duty by purchasing the preferred stock at a time when they possessed
material, nonpublic information.
At trial, the court of chancery granted the SLC’s motion to dismiss. The vice
chancellor applied the two-part standard articulated in Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430
A.2d 779 (Del. 1981) to the SLC’s motion to dismiss. Part one of the Zapata
standard analyzes the independence and good faith of the committee members, the
quality of its investigation, and the reasonableness of its conclusion. Part two of the
Zapata standard may be utilized at the discretion of the court and seeks to strike a
balance between a legitimate corporate claim and the corporation’s best interest.
The vice chancellor found that the SLC met its burden under part one of the Zapata
standard and upheld the SLC’s motion to dismiss under part two.
On appeal, the Delaware Supreme Court held that a Brophy claim does not
require an element of harm before disgorgement is an available remedy. Prior to
addressing the availability of the disgorgement remedy in a Brophy claim, the court
first invoked the exception to the mootness doctrine. During the pendency of the
appeal, Primedia entered into an acquisition agreement with TPG Capital. In the
transaction, Kahn’s stock would be purchased for cash. Thus, at the closing of the
transaction Kahn would lose standing to pursue the case and the issue would be
moot. While the court normally declines to decide moot issues, the court invoked
the exception to mootness doctrine because the Brophy issue had been raised in other
actions pending before the court of chancery.
Having invoked the exception to mootness doctrine, the court went on to
resolve the legal issue concerning the availability of the disgorgement remedy for a
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Brophy claim. The court, exercising de novo review, held that a Brophy claim does not
require an element of harm before disgorgement is an available remedy. First, the
court looked to the venerable case Brophy v. Cities Service Co., 31 Del. Ch. 241 (Del.
Ch. 1949), where the court of chancery expressly rejected the argument that the
plaintiffs failed to state a claim because there was no harm to the corporation.
Accordingly, the court found that when a fiduciary profits from confidential
corporate information, equity requires disgorgement of those profits even if the
corporation did not suffer actual harm. Further, the court reaffirmed the elements
necessary for a plaintiff to prevail on a Brophy claim. Specifically, that the corporate
fiduciary possessed material nonpublic information and used that information
improperly by making trades motivated by that information. Finally, the court held
that Pfeiffer was no longer good law to the extent it conflicted with its interpretation
of Brophy. The court, relying on Guth v. Loft, Inc., 5 A.2d 503 (Del. 1939), specifically
rejected Pfeiffer’s narrow interpretation of the availability of disgorgement in a Brophy
claim.
After establishing that a Brophy claim does not require an element of harm for
disgorgement to be an available remedy, the court reviewed the trial court’s analysis
under the two-part Zapata standard. The court, exercising de novo review, agreed with
the vice chancellor’s determination that the SLC had met its burden under part one
of the Zapata standard. The court cited the length and thoroughness of the SLC
investigation report and agreed that the SLC acted in good faith and had a reasonable
basis for its conclusions.
However, under part two of the Zapata standard, the court, reviewing for
abuse of discretion, was unable to determine whether the vice chancellor had upheld
the SLC’s motion to dismiss by improperly relying on Pfeiffer. Even though the SLC
did not rely of Pfeiffer in its motion to dismiss, it did argue lack of harm during oral
argument. Further, the vice chancellor did not discuss the elements he relied on in
granting the SLC’s motion to dismiss. Accordingly, the court could not determine
whether the vice chancellor had improperly relied on Pfeiffer and the lack of harm to
the corporation in his decision to dismiss the claim. As such, the Delaware Supreme
Court reversed the decision of the court of chancery and remanded the case for
proceedings consistent with its interpretation of Brophy.
In light of this decision, transactional attorneys should be aware that harm to
the corporation is no longer required for disgorgement to be an available remedy for
a Brophy claim. This makes it easier for a plaintiff’s attorney to bring an action where
a fiduciary has been unjustly enriched through the use of material nonpublic
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corporate information but the corporation has not suffered any harm. Also,
corporate attorneys, when faced with a Brophy claim, must refrain from arguing lack
of harm as a defense to a Brophy claim. While a judge will readily disregard this
argument, it may leave the door open for an appeal if the judge does not specifically
state what elements were relied on in granting a motion to dismiss. As shown in
Kahn v. Kolberg, a case will be appealable if lack of harm is argued and one cannot
determine whether the trial judge relied on lack of harm to the corporation in
upholding the motion to dismiss.
________

Appraisal rights might not be triggered in connection with a merger of a
public target corporation so long as the shareholders are not required to
receive cash and can, instead, elect to receive publicly listed securities. Krieger
v. Wesco Financial Corp., 30 A.3d 54 (Del. Ch. 2011).
By N. Adam Dietrich II
Appraisal rights are the rights of shareholders to demand the payment of a
fair price for their shares during a merger or other extraordinary corporate event. In
this sense, appraisal rights ensure that minority shareholders receive the benefit of
their bargain by preventing corporations involved in mergers from paying less than
what the company is worth. For Delaware corporations, appraisal rights are available
under section 262(b) of the Delaware General Corporation Law (“DGCL”). In
Krieger v. Wesco Financial Corp., Joel Krieger (“Plaintiff”), a minority owner of ten
shares of Wesco Financial Corporation (“Wesco”) stock, brought suit to enjoin a
forward triangular merger between Wesco, its parent Berkshire Hathaway Inc.
(“Berkshire”), and Montana Acquisitions, LLC on the grounds that the common
shareholders were entitled to appraisal rights and that the disclosures regarding the
appraisal rights were false and misleading. At issue in this case was whether the
“market out” exception to the general appraisal right authorized Wesco’s denial of
such rights or whether the “exception to the exception” contained in section
262(b)(2) of the DGCL applied. Ultimately, the court granted the defendants’
request for partial summary judgment, holding that the minority shareholders were
not entitled to appraisal rights because they were not required to accept a form of
merger consideration triggering appraisal rights under section 262(b)(2) of the
DGCL.
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Wesco is a Delaware corporation engaged in the insurance, furniture rental,
and steel service center businesses. On February 4, 2011, Wesco and Berkshire,
owner of 80.1% of Wesco’s outstanding common stock, entered into a merger
agreement in which Wesco would merge into Montana Acquisitions, LLC—a
wholly-owned subsidiary of Berkshire formed solely to consummate the merger.
Pursuant to the agreement, Wesco’s minority shareholders were issued an election
form in which they could decide to either (1) convert their shares into the right to
receive $385 per share in cash, (2) receive an equivalent value in publically traded
shares of Berkshire Class B common stock, or (3) receive a combination of cash and
Berkshire common stock. Those shareholders that did not make an election would
receive cash.
The shareholders were also issued a proxy statement in connection with the
merger disclosing Wesco and Berkshire’s belief that, pursuant to Delaware law,
dissenting shareholders would not be entitled to appraisal rights because they were
not required to accept cash for their shares; rather, they had the option to elect any of
the three forms of consideration. The election form was due two business days prior
to the special meeting held to consider the merger, while the proxy was due at any
time before the actual vote. The merger was approved at the special meeting, and no
Wesco shareholder demanded appraisal.
Plaintiff filed suit the day after the merger announcement and sought a
preliminary injunction, arguing that the shareholders were entitled to appraisal rights
and that statements regarding such rights in the proxy statement were false and
misleading. The injunction was denied, and, thereafter, the parties cross-moved for
partial summary judgment on the issue of appraisal rights. The Delaware Court of
Chancery granted the defendants’ request for partial summary judgment and held
that the Wesco shareholders were not entitled to appraisal rights because they were
not required to accept a form of merger consideration triggering appraisal rights
under section 262(b)(2) of the DGCL.
The court began its review of the applicable statutory authority by noting
that, as a general matter, Wesco shareholders would be entitled to appraisal rights
under section 262(b) of the DGCL. However, the court explained that section
262(b)(1) creates the “market-out” exception, which states that “‘no appraisal rights .
. . shall be available for the shares of any class or series of stock, which stock . . .
[was] either (i) listed on a national securities exchange or (ii) held of record by more
than 2,000 holders.’” Because Wesco’s common stock was listed on a national
securities exchange before the merger, appraisal rights would not be available under
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the market-out exception. With that said, the court noted a further section—known
as the “exception to the exception”—which “restores appraisal rights to a class or
series of stock otherwise covered by the market-out exception if the holders are
required to accept certain types of consideration [in the merger].” Under section
262(b)(2), the appraisal-triggering consideration does not include, among other
categories, shares of stock listed on a national securities exchange, cash in lieu of
fractional shares, and any combination of shares of stock and cash in lieu of
fractional shares. Therefore, Plaintiff argued that Wesco shareholders who declined
to make an election were required to accept cash as consideration for their shares;
thus, the “exception to the exception” applied, and they were entitled to appraisal
rights.
The court rejected Plaintiff’s argument by first noting that Plaintiff’s focus on
the individual shareholders who failed to make an election was misguided. Rather, the
court explained that “[t]he General Corporation Law in fact makes appraisal rights
available on a transactional and class-wide (or series-wide) basis. Stockholders can
choose individually whether to perfect and pursue their appraisal rights, but the
underlying statutory availability of appraisal rights is not a function of individual
choice.” Furthermore, the court noted that even if you focus on the individual
shareholders, it would be incorrect to say that they were “required” to accept cash.
These shareholders had a choice to either make an election and select a form of
consideration desirable to them, or they could not make an election and receive the
default cash consideration. To make this point, the court quoted Jean-Paul Sartre,
who said: “‘[W]hat is impossible is not to choose. I can always choose, but I must
also realize that, if I decide not to choose, that still constitutes a choice.’”
Next, the court addressed the Plaintiff’s argument that those shareholders
who wanted to vote against the merger had no choice but to receive the default cash
consideration because the election deadline preceded the vote. The court quickly
dismissed this argument, however, because “[t]he merger agreement did not
condition the right to elect a particular form of consideration on voting for or
against the merger.” Similarly, the court rejected Plaintiff’s argument that Wesco’s
shareholders were coerced into not making an election due to a misleading disclosure
relating to their ability to perfect and pursue an appraisal proceeding. The court
reasoned that this type of disclosure, while misleading, could only warrant “a quasiappraisal remedy” in some circumstances but not in cases where appraisal rights were
properly denied. Finally, the court was not persuaded by Plaintiff’s final argument
that the proxy statement equivocated over the availability of appraisal rights. Rather,
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the court found that these disclosures were accurate and complete and that “[t]he
defendants had a strong statutory basis for concluding that appraisal rights were not
available.”
Krieger v. Wesco Financial Corp. is yet another example of the difficulty that
shareholders face when challenging unfavorable corporate decisions in Delaware.
Particularly, this almost insurmountable hurdle becomes increasingly more difficult
when, as here, it appears that the board of directors made an informed decision, in
good faith, and with the best interests of the corporation in mind. In practice, the
court’s decision in Wesco provides guidance for interpreting section 262(b) of the
DGCL and clarifies an unsettled area of law in regards to the availability of appraisal
rights. Transactional attorneys in merger negotiations can now feel comfortable
advising their public corporation clients that they can deny appraisal rights so long as
the shareholders are not required to receive cash and can, instead, opt to receive
publicly listed securities. Furthermore, Wesco suggests that a proxy statement
disclosure is an appropriate means to notify the shareholders of the availability of
appraisal rights. Finally, corporate litigators representing complaining shareholders
should be mindful that the availability of appraisal rights is determined on a classwide, rather than individual, basis. For example, just because an individual
shareholder declined to make an election and was required to accept cash does not
mean that the shareholder is entitled to appraisal rights.
________

An equity dilution plaintiff may initiate both derivative and direct claims
without showing an equivalent correlation between their decrease in equity
and the increase in controlling shareholders’ ownership. Dubroff v. Wren
Holdings, LLC, C.A. No. 3940-VCN, 2011 Del. Ch. LEXIS 164, 2011 WL 5222866
(Del. Ch. Oct. 28, 2011).
By Devin Lyon
In Dubroff v. Wren Holdings, LLC the Delaware Court of Chancery refined,
inter alia, the issue of whether minority shareholders’ equity must decrease at the
exact amount of the increase in the controlling shareholders’ equity when pursuing a
claim for equity dilution. The case arose during the fallout from the 2008 financial
crisis in a time of extreme economic uncertainty and a public decline in deference
toward corporate directors. Dubroff reexamined and lessened Delaware’s exacting
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standard regarding equity dilution by amplifying the holding from Gentile v. Rossette,
906 A.2d 91 (Del. 2006).
Dubroff involved two sets of plaintiffs—the Dubroff Plaintiffs and the Fuchs
Plaintiffs—who were minority shareholders in Nine Systems Corporation (“NSC”).
Both sets of Plaintiffs filed lawsuits against NSC’s control group and four of NSC’s
controlling shareholders for, inter alia, breach of fiduciary duties and unjust
enrichment.
The complaints stemmed from the controlling shareholders’
recapitalization plan (the “Recapitalization”), which involved a reverse stock split, a
stock reclassification that gave some Fuchs Plaintiffs preferred stock, and
amendments to the certificate of incorporation. Fourteen minority shareholders
signed a new shareholders’ agreement, detailing how each signatory understood the
agreement and had the opportunity to consult counsel. Shortly after implementation
of the Recapitalization, the controlling shareholders sent an update notice to all
shareholders that explained the reverse stock split. The update notice did not,
however, explain who benefited from the Recapitalization.
Ultimately, the Recapitalization resulted in the ballooning of the controlling
shareholders’ ownership in NSC’s equity value from approximately 56% to 90%.
Minority shareholders first became aware that their equity had been reduced to less
than 6% four years after the Recapitalization when NSC sent proxy materials to all
shareholders to receive approval for NSC’s acquisition by another company. After
the Dubroff Plaintiffs failed in their attempt to gain class certification (in the sister
case of Dubroff I), the Fuchs Plaintiffs (hereafter referred to as “Plaintiffs”) filed
motions to intervene and consolidate the two Dubroff cases.
Delaware law was in flux at the time of this opinion. Equity dilution law had
historically required plaintiffs to plead a derivative claim to proceed. A derivative
claim, in turn, required plaintiffs to have continuous ownership in the company to
establish a cause of action (meaning former shareholders could not bring an equity
dilution claim because they no longer had ownership in the company). However,
under Gentile, the Delaware Supreme Court held that some equity dilution claims
could be pled derivatively and directly, which would permit former shareholders to
bring equity dilution claims. These dual claims arise when (1) a majority or
controlling shareholder “causes the corporation to issue ‘excessive’ shares of its
stock [for the controlling shareholder’s assets] of a lesser value,” and (2) the
controlling shareholder’s ownership increases while the minority shareholders suffer
a corresponding decrease in ownership.

2012]

CASE COMMENTARIES

415

Delaware equity dilution law also historically required plaintiffs to show an
equivalent correlation between their decrease in equity and the controlling
shareholders’ increase in ownership. Therefore, Defendants argued that the ability to
bring dual pleadings under Gentile only applied in cases where such an equivalent
correlation could be shown. In other words, if the Plaintiffs could not show harm to
their equity that exactly matched the gain for controlling shareholders, Defendants
argued that they were not entitled to exploit the Gentile holding.
The Delaware Court of Chancery held that the Plaintiffs could proceed with
a direct equity dilution claim because their complaint contained sufficient factual
evidence to allow a reasonable inference of individual injury. The court of chancery
began by creating a three-part test for determining whether Plaintiffs could pursue a
direct equity dilution claim against the controlling shareholders. The direct claim
could continue if Plaintiffs pled facts alleging that the Defendants: (1) were
controlling shareholders, (2) were responsible for issuing “excessive” shares to the
controlling shareholders, and (3) through the share issuance, increased their
ownership while decreasing minority shareholders’ ownership.
After finding that the Plaintiffs had sufficiently pled facts supporting the first
two prongs, the court moved on to the third prong, where it stated the noteworthy
aspects of its opinion. The Defendants argued that there could be no claim for
equity dilution because some of the Plaintiffs received preferred stock—seemingly
upgrading their previously held common stock. However, the court chided such
simplistic interpretations of direct equity dilution claims that require equivalent
correlations between controlling shareholder increase and minority shareholder
decrease. The court inferred that, logically, minority shareholders could enjoy an
increase in ownership and still have a direct claim for equity dilution. Or, as the
Delaware Supreme Court upheld in Gatz v. Ponsoldt, 925 A.2d 1265 (Del. 2007),
direct equity dilution exists when controlling shareholders receive no benefit but
minority shareholders lose ownership. Thus, the court of chancery substantially
broadened the direct equity dilution claim. As the court stated, the Plaintiffs alleged
that the “primary effect” of the Recapitalization was “an extraction from [NSC’s]
public shareholders and a redistribution to [NSC’s Control Group], of a [substantial]
portion of the economic value and voting power embodied in the minority interest.”
One obstacle for the court’s opinion was that minority shareholders provided
written consent for the Recapitalization before it went into effect by signing either
the amended shareholder agreement or the proxy materials before acquisition. The
court cited this case’s sister opinion in Dubroff I, and noted that while the controlling
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shareholder disclosure requirements under section 228(e) are unsettled law, the
complaint is well-pled and withstands scrutiny, regardless. If the statute requires full
disclosure, the complaint supports the inference that the Defendants misled
Plaintiffs. On the other hand, if the statute does not require full disclosure, the
complaint supports the inference that the Defendants intentionally omitted material
information to mislead the Plaintiffs. Furthermore, the court stated that the
Plaintiffs were harmed by the Defendants’ insufficient disclosure because they were
unable to bring any legal action against the Recapitalization due to lack of
information. Therefore, the court allowed the Plaintiffs’ claims to proceed.
The court’s final act of significance stemmed directly from its
aforementioned analysis of the Defendants’ disclosure. The court extended its
holding that the Defendants inadequately disclosed information to skirt the threeyear statute of limitations. The court stated that, due to the inadequate disclosure in
the shareholders’ agreement, Plaintiffs did not receive inquiry notice of the
transaction until receiving the proxy materials just before the company’s acquisition.
Furthermore, the court held that the pending Dubroff I class action case tolled the
statute of limitations. The court reasoned that creating a rule that tolls the statute of
limitations during pending class action certification suits is necessary to avoid forcing
all class members to intervene in the certification suit to preserve their claims.
The Dubroff case displays the judiciary’s renewed focus on the boardroom,
and its willingness to vigorously pursue corporate executives. While the specific
holdings of this case are not binding authority on Tennessee courts, all transactional
attorneys should be cognizant of the corporate climate captured within this case.
Delaware is reputable in the business world due to traditionally favorable corporate
laws. Thus, if the business stronghold of Delaware displays this degree of
willingness to crack down on business practices by allowing derivative claims to be
plead directly, discounting written agreements, and subverting the statute of
limitations, corporations everywhere should be wary.
Transactional attorneys should recognize the judiciary’s willingness to punish
questionable corporate behavior and embrace defensive and conservative postures.
Attorneys should advise business clients to forego legally questionable tactics to
avoid litigation. The financial crisis has already claimed many victims, but litigious
attorneys may soon discover that their clients are next.
________

